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RADHA D'SOUZA*

Colonial Law and the Tungabhadra
Disputes: Lifting the Veil over the
Agreement of 1892
ABSTRACT
In recent years, Indian interstate water disputes have grown
both in number and contentiousness, exacerbating an already
fragile federalism. The genesis of these disputes is traceable, in
part, to India's colonial legal history. During the colonial era,
interstate water disputes occurred between the Indian States and
the British Presidencies. The disputes were both the cause ofand the consequence stemming from -application of English
principles of prescriptionand prescriptive rights to an alien social
and environmental context. Colonial law cast social relationships
over water within a framework that institutionalized an imperial
interest in water. Those same colonial legal principles and
statutes continue to define social relationships over water
throughout much of India today.
The dispute over Tungabhadra waters and Kaveri waters
between Mysore State and the Madras Presidency was one of the
earliest interstate disputes to be resolved through an agreement
on water sharing. The Agreement of 1892 became the legal basis
for regulation of interstate water allocation and continues to
govern and influence water-sharingprinciples between states in
post-IndependenceIndia.
This article analyses the Agreement of 1892 in order to better
understand the role of colonial law in Indian interstate water
conflicts. Colonial rule introduced a disjuncture between legal
rights of States as set out in treaties, settlements, and other legal
instruments and the reality in society as reflected by geographical
and historical conditions. Colonial rule introduced conflicting
trajectories of economic development, different political
structures, and different mixes of traditional and modern
technology, and situated those differences within a legal
framework that gave the disjuncture its structure.Indeed, India's
early experiments in colonial water regulation have had lasting
structuralimplicationsfor water use throughout the country.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1890, the Madras Presidency complained to the Government
of India that the state of Mysore was constructing new irrigation projects
on the Tungabhadra and Kaveri river systems.' The legal basis for the
Madras Presidency's complaint was that Madras farmers had acquired
prescriptive rights over the waters of the two rivers based on ancient use
since the pre-Christian era. 2 The new irrigation works constructed-or
proposed for construction-by Mysore, would, in the Presidency's view,
adversely affect the Kurnool-Cuddapah canals in the Krishna delta
regions and the Kaveri anicut in the Kaveri delta regions. 3 Although
Indian water use practices and technologies dated back to the preChristian era, the legal rights of prescription and easement were
4
distinctly British in origin.
The claims for prescriptive interstate rights came in the wake of
the Madras Compulsory Labour Act of 1858, 5 the Madras Irrigation Cess
Act of 1865,6 and, most importantly, the Indian Easement Act of 18827
within the Presidency. The constitutional framework for the statutes in

1.

3 CENT. WATER COMM'N, INTERSTATE MATTERS DIRECTORATE, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

ON RIVERS IN INDIA 277-78 (1995). Prior to Independence in 1947, parts of what is presently
the Union of India were under direct British rule. Territories under the British East India
Company's rule were known as Presidencies. Later, under the constitutional reforms of the
early twentieth century, these territories came to be referred to as Provinces. After
Independence, under constitutional federalism, the units comprising the Union of India
were referred to as the States of the Union. Two-thirds of the present Union of India
consisted of formally autonomous protectorates of Britain, called Princely States or the
Indian States. Bilateral treaties specific to each State governed the relations between the
Indian States and Britain. Britain's relationship with the Indian States was referred to as the
"Paramountacy." A small number of states known as Agency States were annexed
territories where the rulers were appointed to be agents of the Crown. Id.
2. M. BASHEER HUSSAIN, THE CAUVERY WATER DISPUTE: AN ANALYSIS OF MYSORE'S
CASE 1 (1972). Throughout this article I use Hussain's book as the source for the
correspondence between Mysore state and the Madras Presidency. I found this book in the
basement of the Institute for Social and Economic Change in Bangalore, India, and
photocopied relevant pages. In the book the author had essentially reproduced the original
documents from the original archival source with brief introductory comments. The article
draws from the original documents as reprinted in the book.
3. Id.
4. CTR. FOR SCI. & ENV'T, DYING WISDOM: RISE, FALL AND POTENTIAL OF INDIA'S
TRADITIONAL WATER HARVESTING SYSTEMS 11-24 (Anil Agarwal & Sunita Narain eds.,

1997).
5. M.S. VANI, ROLE OF PANCHAYAT INSTITUTIONS IN IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT: LAW
AND POLICY 55 (1992).

6. Id.
7. The Indian Easements Act, Act No. 5 of 1882, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/
(last visited June 23, 2005) [hereinafter Indian Easements Act].
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the Madras Presidency was the Government of India Act of 1858,8 which
introduced direct Crown rule. The statute incorporated, in modified
form, the last charter issued to the East India Company under the
Charter Act of 1853. 9
The state of Mysore disputed the Madras Presidency's
prescriptive claims. 10 Mysore's objections were based on similar claims
of immemorial use, prescription, and water appropriation practices that
Mysore farmers had observed since "the time whereof no mind is to the
contrary," the common law rule for prescriptive claims." Indeed, it is
not necessary to labor the point that irrigation technologies and uses in
the Tungabhadra basin date back to the legal requirements for
prescription in common law. 12 It is generally accepted now that the
Tungabhadra basin in the pre-colonial era was dotted with irrigation
13
works, large and small, dating back to the medieval era and earlier.
However, despite the prevalence of irrigation works at the time,
Mysore did not develop an irrigation statute until 1932.14 The Tank
Panchayat Act of 191115 provided for the maintenance, restoration, and
repair of "minor" tanks. 16 In contrast, regulation of irrigation was
performed largely through administrative rules, departmental directives,
and customary law. 17 The constitutional context for the 1890 disputes
between Madras and Mysore was the "rendition" of Mysore-the
Instrument of Transfer of 188118 by which Mysore was restored to
sovereignty on limited terms and that became the basis for what came to
be termed in political literature "indirect rule." 19
The disputes culminated in the first major interstate agreement
to detail water sharing between two states on the Indian sub-continent. 20

8. C.L ANAND & H.N. SETH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AcT, 1935, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 47 (1992).
9. Id. at 37-39.
10. HUSSAIN, supra note 2, at 3-4.
11. 2 EARL Jowrrr & CLIFFORD WALSH, Jowrrr's DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 1413
(John Burke ed., 1977).
12. Id.
13. CTR. FOR SCI. & ENv'T, supra note 4, at 205.
14. VANI, supranote 5, at 106.
15. Id. at 103.
16. Id.
17. See generally id. chs. 2, 3.
18.

BJORN HETrNE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDIRET RULE: MYSORE 1881-1947, at

48-51 (1978).
19. John Hurd II, The Economic Consequences of Indirect Rule in India, 12 INDIAN ECON. &
SOC. HIsT. REv. 169 (1975).
20. See generally 3 CENT. WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 277-93. The Agreement of
1892 relates to the Tungabhadra and Kaveri river systems. Id. This article focuses primarily
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In retrospect, the disputes, the Agreement- signed on February 18,
1892-and the sociological ramifications stemming from both assume
amplified relevance today for two principal reasons.
First, there is a renewed interest in Indian tank irrigation and
traditional water use practices, and increasing support within
international development agencies for revisiting these historic
techniques. 21 The growing literature on water appropriation frames the
issue primarily as a technological problem within the dichotomous
categories of "traditional versus modern irrigation technologies" and
"large versus small works." 22 Yet, the legal and institutional framework
for traditional water systems and the sociological implications of
superimposing colonial legal concepts on indigenous technologies and
practices is a research problem that, thus far, has not been analyzed in
the literature. Such an analysis requires integrating the legal and
institutional framework supporting traditional water systems with
traditional Indian water technologies. Fortunately, the Agreement of
1892 (Agreement) affords a useful opportunity to examine the interface
between traditional irrigation systems and colonial law, as well as the
resulting structural tensions.
The second reason the Agreement assumes relevance in modern
India relates to the fact that today's interstate conflicts over river waters
exacerbate an already strained federal-state relationship in India and
remain relatively under-theorized. 23 The Agreement did not resolve
conflicts over Tungabhdra waters. Instead, it led to a chain of subsequent
agreements and disputes between the Madras Presidency and Mysore in
1892,24 1933, 25 and 1944;26 two between the Madras Presidency and the
state of Hyderabad in 193827 and 1944;28 supplemental agreements in

on the Tungabhadra dispute, touching on the Kaveri dispute for comparative perspectives
and questions of interpretation arising from the Agreement.
21.

See generally JASHBHAI PATEL, STORY OF A RIVULET ARVARI: FROM DEATH TO

REBIRTH (1997); CTR. FOR SCI. & ENV'T, supra note 4.
22. See generally SATYAJIT SINGH, TAMING THE WATERS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
LARGE DAMS IN INDIA (1997); Nirmal Sengupta, Field Systems, Property Reform and
Indigenous Irrigation (paper presented at Madras Institute of Development Studies
conference on The Heyday of Colonial Rule, 1830s-1914, Sept. 24-27, 1985) (on file with
author).
23. Radha D'Souza, At the Confluence of Law and Geography:Inter-State Water Disputes in
India,33 GEOFORUM 255, 255 (2002).
24. 3 CENT. WATER COMM'N, supra note 1,at 278-98.
25. Id. at 294-95.
26. Id. at 302-06.
27. Id. at 297-98.
28. Id. at 299-301.
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194529 and 1946;30 the States Reorganisation Act of 1956; 31 and the
proceedings before the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal in 197332
(modified in 1976). The disputes threaten to resurface now that the
33
award of 1973/1976 has expired.
The Agreement touched on two principal issues. The first was
related to the application of English common law principles of
prescriptive rights and how they were to be interpreted in regions
dominated by tank irrigation systems. 34 Second, in retrospect, the
Agreement drew attention to the institutional mechanisms that would
need to develop if imperial interests in water were to be reconciled with
a federal polity in the future. 35 Revisiting the Agreement and
contextualizing it helps to illustrate the disjuncture between legal
relations and social relations as a structural feature of Indian society
resulting from colonization. This article uses the Agreement as a point of
departure in an effort to more fully describe the twin dynamic set in
motion by colonial rule.
II. THE AGREEMENT OF 1892
In the Presidencies, irrigation statutes and rules attempted to
define, codify, and regulate access to water between the colonial state
and the agriculturists, on the one hand, and among agriculturists
themselves, on the other. 36 These statutes and rules introduced the
"productive-protective" dichotomy and the "project approach" to water
works that became entrenched in the legal framework as structural
37
conditions of water use:
"Protective" works were those undertaken as measures of
famine relief, which were not required to yield any fixed
rate of return. "Productive" works were expected to yield a

29. Id. at 307.
30. Id. at 308-12.
31. The States Reorganisation Act 1956, Act No. 37 of 1956, available at http://india
code.nic.in/ (last visited June 23, 2005).
32. See KRISHNA WATER DISPUTES TRIBUNAL, GOV'T OF INDIA, THE REPORT OF THE
KRISHNA WATER DISPUTES TRIBUNAL (1973).

33. Id. at 230. The award expired on May 30, 2000.
34. CENT. WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 280.
35. Id.
36. VANI, supra note 5, at 31-73.
37. D'Souza, supra note 23, at 262; Rahda D'Souza, InternationalLaw- Recolonizing the
Third World? Law and Conflicts over Water in the Krishna River Basin [hereinafter D'Souza,
InternationalLaw], in LAW, HISTORY AND COLONIALISM: EMPIRE'S REACH 248 (Diane Kirkby
& Catherine Colborne eds., 2001).
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fixed rate of return ....
Eligibility for subsidies, fiscal
incentives, rates of cess, levies and taxes followed the
categorisation. Different institutional mechanisms and
38
policy frameworks evolved for the two types of work.
The process of alienating irrigation works from agricultural
practices of the local populace began when the East India Company
started the process of inventorying irrigation works in the Deccan
region, later classifying them for revenue and administrative purposes
into "major" and "minor," "productive" and "protective." 39 Using
principles of classification (intelligible differentia), colonial law institutionalized a structural schism in water use. 40 The legal framework created
the conceptual alienation of water from land in law, a condition
precedent for development planning in the post-Independence era. 41 The
Agreement attempted to define, codify, and regulate access to water
between the two states, one semi-sovereign and the other a colony
within the imperial Empire system. 42 It furthered the "project-approach"
by entrenching access to water within interstate agreements. 43 This was
very different from the conceptual separation of water from land in law
and institutional practices in Western capitalist nations, particularly in
the wake of capitalist development. 44
The Agreement of 1892 was signed between the Madras
Presidency and the state of Mysore through the mediation of the
Government of India and the Resident 45 of Mysore, representing the
interests of the Government of India in Mysore. 46 The Agreement placed
irrigation works within a framework that was based on neither statute
nor international treaty. The Agreement therefore did not follow nor did
it precede the standard chain of institutional and contractual
arrangements that legislative processes entail; neither did it give Mysore
the autonomy to negotiate and effectuate international obligations
through international treaty.
38. D'Souza, InternationalLaw, supra note 37.
39. VANI, supra note 5, at 62, 87-88, 94-95, 101-02.
40. D'Souza, InternationalLaw, supra note 37, at 246, 248, 251.
41. Id. at 245-46.
42. 3 CENT. WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 280.
43. For more on a "project approach" to water, see D'Souza, International Law, supra
note 37, at 246, 248, 251.
44. D'Souza, supra note 23, at 258.
45.

HENRY YULE & A.C. BURNELL, HOBSON-JOBSON: THE ANGLO-INDIAN DICTIONARY

761 (1996). During the Company's rule, the term "resident" was used to refer to the chiefs
of the Company's commercial establishments in the provinces. Later it was used to refer to
the representative of the Governor-General at an important native court. Id.
46. 3 CENT. WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 277-78.
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The Agreement nevertheless conceptually alienated irrigation
works from their embedded place in agricultural practice by the manner
in which such works were defined in the document. The Agreement
defined "New Irrigation Works," "New Reservoir," and "Repair of
Irrigation Reservoirs" and provided that no new irrigation works were
47
to be constructed by Mysore without previous reference to Madras.
Clause 1 of the Agreement provided:
1. In these rules:
(1) "New irrigation reservoirs" shall mean and include such
irrigation reservoirs or tanks as have not before existed, or,
having once existed, have been abandoned and been in
disuse for more than 30 years past.
(2) "A new irrigation Reservoir" fed by an anicut across a
stream shall be regarded as a "New Irrigation reservoir
across" that stream.
(3) "Repair of irrigation reservoirs" shall include (a)
increase of the level of waste weirs and other
improvements of existing irrigation reservoirs or tanks,
provided that either the quantity of water to be
impounded, or the area to be irrigated is not more than the
quantity previously impounded, or the area previously
irrigated by them; and (b) the substitution of a new
irrigation reservoir for and in supersession of an existing
irrigation reservoir but in a different situation, or for and in
supersession of a group of existing irrigation reservoirs,
provided that the new work either impounds not more
than the total quantity of water previously impounded by
the superceded works, or irrigates not more than the total
area previously irrigated by the superceded works.
(4) Any increase of capacity other than what falls under
"Repair of irrigation Reservoirs" defined above shall be
regarded as "New Irrigation Reservoir." 48
Under the terms of the Agreement, Mysore was restrained from
undertaking any "new irrigation reservoirs" without prior consent of

47. Id. at 279.
48. Id. An anicut is used in the irrigation of the Madras Presidency to refer to the dam
constructed across a river in order to fill and regulate the supply of the channels drawn off
from it-the cardinal work, in fact, of the great irrigation systems. The word, which has of
late years become familiar all over India, is derived from the Tamil word "anai-kattu,"
"dam building." YULE, supra note 45, at 30-31.
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Madras. 49 The restrictions applied to the Tunga, Bhadra, Tungabhadra,
and the Vedavati rivers and included 17 streams and drainage areas
specified in the schedule to the Agreement.50
In addition, the Agreement contained the following conceptual
underpinnings:
a. Water works could be alienated from land for the
purposes of administration;5 1
b. The state could and should monitor and police
appropriation of water within its boundaries in order to
discharge its responsibilities to neighboring states; 52
c. The state had the legal standing (locus standii) to negotiate
and represent the interests of the agriculturists within its
jurisdiction;5 3
d. The state could enter into agreements with other states in
the absence of a specific mandate, through the securing of
contracts, licences or permits from the agriculturists,
whether represented in person, by corporate entities or
through the legislative process (entailing pre-legislative
public submissions and other parliamentary processes)s 4
These conceptual underpinnings were hardly surprising given
rule under an imperial-colonial regime. Indeed the literature on colonial
irrigation and the colonial state is extensive and need not be traversed in
detail here.5 5 The significance of the Agreement lies in the legal
principles it invoked and the ways in which those principles were
49.
50.

3 CENT. WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 279.
Id. at 282-89.

51. D'Souza, InternationalLaw, supra note 37, at 245-46.
52. The Agreement was signed by the State, which in Western theory represents its
citizens and, therefore, as signatory, would be expected to enforce the terms of the
Agreement.
53. The State was recognized as signatory and therefore competent to sign on behalf of
its subjects.
54. The State was not a functioning democracy as we understand the term today.
55. See, e.g., VANI, supra note 5; Sengupta, supra note 22; Nirmal Sengupta, Irrigation:
Traditional vs. Modern, 20 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1919-38 (1985) [hereinafter Sengupta,
Traditional vs. Modern]; Nirmal Sengupta, Colonial Impact on Agriculture: A Systems View
(paper presented at International Workshop on Comparative Studies of Rural
Transformation in Asia, Oct. 2-4, 1986) (on file with author); Alex Bolding et al., Modules for
Modernisation:Colonial Irrigation in India and the Technological Dimension of Agrarian Change,
31 J. DEV. STUD. 805 (1995); ZAHEER BABER, THE SCIENCE OF EMPIRE: SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE, CIVILIZATION AND COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA (1998); Agarwal, supra note 4;
NATURE, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM: ESSAYS ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF SOUTH
ASIA, STUDIES IN SOCIAL ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY (David Arnold &

Ramachandra Guha eds., 1995).
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modified and used in the colonial context to arrive at the concepts on
which water sharing between states-and, indeed, within states-came
to be based. These concepts and principles govern social relations over
56
water even today.
The legal principle forming the basis of water sharing in the
Agreement is "prescription." 57 Clause III of the Agreement provided
that, if Mysore wished to construct any "New Irrigation reservoir" and
applied to the Madras government,
[t]he Madras Government shall be bound not to refuse such
consent except for the protection of prescriptive rights
already acquired and actually existing, the existence, extent,
nature of such right and the mode of exercising it being in
every case determined in accordance with the law on the
subject of prescriptive rights to use of water and in
under all the
accordance with what is fair and reasonable
58
circumstances of each individual case.
Prescription as the underlying basis for legal rights to water between
states presents two potential problems, both of which are discussed in
greater detail in the sections that follow. The first problem relates to the
social, historical, constitutional, and institutional context within which
59
rights such as prescription and easements existed and continue to exist
in Britain and the Euro-American nations, generally. The second
problem arises from attempting to superimpose law from one geohistorical context onto another -in this case from Britain onto India. In
addition, there is a third difficulty, namely the problem of attempting to
adapt technology to fit within culturally novel legal regimes-for
example, the attempt to fit tank irrigation within the British legal regime.

56. See generally The Interstate Water Disputes Act, Act No. 33 of 1956, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/ (last visited June 27, 2005), and the adjudication of disputes under
the Act. See also KRISHNA WATER DISPUTES TRIBUNAL, supranote 32.
57. JOWIrr & WALSH, supra note 11, at 1412. Prescription is a right, immunity, or
obligation that "exists by reason of lapse of time." Id.
58. 3 CENT. WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 80.
59. JowITr & WALSH, supra note 11, at 675. "An easement is an incorporeal hereditament and is a privilege without profit." Id. The Indian Easement Act of 1882 defines an
easement as "a right which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses, as such, for the
beneficial enjoyment of that land, to do and continue to do something, or to prevent and
continue to prevent something being done, in or upon, or in respect of, certain other land
not his own." Indian Easements Act, supra note 7.
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III. PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS: LAW AND CONTEXT
European legal systems are a fusion of six strands of European
legal history: Roman law, feudal or seigneurial law, canon law
(ecclesiastical law), royal law, merchant law (lex mercatoria), and natural
law. 60 Simply stated, the differences between the legal systems in
different Euro-American nations may be traced to varying emphasis on
the six constituent strands.
The conceptual underpinnings of European legal systems derive
principally from Roman law. In the words of Geoffrey Samuel, "Since
Roman times, there have been very few new and independent
conceptual ideas [in law]." 61 Roman law, in turn, was based upon three
fundamental legal categories: Law of Persons or Obligations, Law of
Things or Property, and Law of Actions (remedies, rights and
enforcement machinery). 62 The formal divide between Roman law and
politics was the division between the "public" and the "private." 63 At the
same time, the dichotomy between public and private relationships
formed part of the overall definition of the Roman-and now, the
modem European -state. 64 As Fraz Wieacker states, "Roman law is a
bond of law by which so often the West is held together." 65
The lasting effect of Roman law on modem European legal
systems may be attributed to "the Roman concept of political power as a
legal order;... the strict isolation of this legal order from its social and
economic background; and...the control of legal decision-making by
means of a consistent system of cognitive principles." 66 These
characteristics of Roman law gave European nations the legal and
institutional tools necessary to sustain an expansionist social system.
Indeed, the word colony (coloniae) dates back to the Roman Empire. 67 A
network of Roman and Latin coloniae made possible the expansion of the
68
city-state into vast regions.
Although European notions of public, private, and the state have
undergone transformations over time-from the Roman era through

60.

MICHAEL E. TIGAR, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 8-9 (1977).

61. Geoffrey Samuel, Roman Law and Modern Capitalism, 4 LEGAL STUDIES 185, 209
(1984).
62. Id. at 192.
63. Id. at 185.
64. Id. at 191.
65. Franz Wieacker, The Importance of Roman Law for Western Civilization and Western
Legal Thought, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 258 (1981).
66. Id. at 262.
67. Id. at 264.
68. Id.
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feudal times, followed by the subsequent rise of liberal theories of state
within capitalism, and later, the spectacular expansion of modem
corporate entities-the three concepts are nevertheless organic to
European social histories and social practices. 69 It becomes necessary to
revisit these basic concepts and ideas in order to begin to grasp the
implications of applying principles of prescription to an interstate water
sharing agreement in a colonial context.
Prescriptive rights are, by definition, rights situated in the
"private" realm. 70 Based on Roman law, they were later modified by
canon law and influenced by English common law. 71 Prescriptive rights
are attached to land and/or property and are not personal to
landowners. 72 Prescriptive rights may be claimed between citizens
(private rights), or between citizens and the state (public property
rights), as in the case of commons, right of passage, or navigation
rights. 73
The legal principles that govern treaties and covenants between
75
nations (ius gentium-law of nations, 74 lex fori-law of the forum, ius
76
commune-common law ) are very different from the public and
private rights between citizens inter se and citizens and states. Indeed,
from the very character of prescriptive rights, it can be said that the state
can make no prescriptive claims either against citizens or against other
states. 77 In the colonial context, this public/private divide in law and
society was highly problematic for the state and remains so today.
In contrast, the conceptual underpinnings of Indian legal
systems in the pre-colonial era were founded on concepts of place (e.g.,

69. For the public-private divide as well as problems arising from it in Western law,
see generally, TIGAR, supra note 60; Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate
Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429 (1982); Duncan
Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1332
(1982); Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Case Note on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
70. Jowrvr & WALSH, supranote 11, at 1412.
71.
1956).
72.

THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 304 (5th ed.
Jowrlr & WALSH, supra note 11, at 1412; 14 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND 47 (Lord

Hailsham of St. Marylebone ed., 4th ed. 1975).
73.

14 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supranote 72, at 36,47,90.

74. Samuel, supranote 61, at 187.
75. Wieacker, supranote 65, at 280.
76. Id. at 258, 260, 269, 278, 280.
77. As prescriptive rights are about rights of landowners and State/Crown lands are
part of the public domain, the State cannot claim prescriptive rights against private
landowners.
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village) and ethnic membership (jati).78 Under these early legal systems,
the state was a tenuous institution at best. 79 Furthermore, the legal,
political, social, moral, and institutional dimensions of society were not
readily segregable under these legal systems. 80 Although rights and
obligations to water use were defined and regulated, the institutional
framework for exercising those rights had not developed anything
comparable to the European concepts of "public," "private," and the
"state." 81
Colonial law legislated into existence a private realm in Indian
society through the fiat of positive statute law. Private law in the colonial
context, including the most sacred of all private law-the law of
contracts-was developed through public legislation. 82 In contrast, the
evolution of private law in European society came through the legal
recognition of both the habitual transactions of people in their daily lives
and the customary practices that had evolved over time. When private
rights are decreed through legislation, they take on an instrumentalist
character and the attempted translation of statutory law into customary
practice becomes problematic.
In the European context, private rights were not legislated into
existence de novo as they were in colonial India. Rather, from time to
time statutory law codified, rationalized and modified existing European
practices.8 3 In contrast, the Madras government legislated into existence
prescriptive easement rights.84 Such legislation suggests a contradiction
in terms, as there could not be "new" prescriptive rights if such rights
derived from historical use, and if the old modes of water use were to be
recognized by way of prescription then the state could have no role in
regulating such rights.
Unlike the Madras legislation, in Mysore there were no statutes
regulating water until 1932. 85 Instead, the institutional context under
indirect rule was much more in tune with customary institutions and
practices. The administrative rules on water, however inequitable, did

78. Satish Saberwal, Enlargementof Scales, PluralTraditions, and Rule of Law: Comparative
Reflections on Europeanand Indian History, 1 REV. OF DEV. & CHANGE 1, 4-5 (1996).
79. Id.
80. See generally id.
81. See, e.g., Radha D'Souza, Contextualising Interstate Conflicts over Krishna Waters, in
LAW, SCIENCE AND IMPERIALISM: HYDERABAD (forthcoming 2005).

82.
83.
84.
85.

See, e.g., Indian Easements Act, supra note 7.
See, e.g., PLUCKNETr, supra note 71, at 325.
Indian Easements Act, supra note 7.
VANI, supra note 5, at 106.
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not transform the structure of the indirectly ruled state as it did the
86
directly ruled states.
Given the contrast between the Madras and Mysore approach to
water rights prior to 1932, it is not entirely clear what the Agreement of
1892 sought to achieve when it stated that the Madras government
would act only to protect prescriptive rights already acquired, with "the
existence, extent, nature of such right and the mode of exercising it being
in every case determined in accordance with the law on the subject of
prescriptive rights to use of water.... "87
A second problem with the Agreement of 1892 was that, in
Mysore's case, the Agreement was not an international treaty, nor was it
domestic legislation. Unlike the case of Madras, in Mysore, the colonial
state was not responsible for enforcing the Agreement once Mysore was
designated a sovereign state following the Instrument of Transfer of 1881
(Instrument). 88
Under the Instrument, Britain restored autonomy to Mysore but
severely restricted its scope. 89 The Instrument represented a unilateral
decision by Britain, as well as a unilateral document. 90 The first three
articles dealt with installation of the Maharaja and the line of
succession. 91 The Governor-General retained the right to de-recognize
any ruler if he showed "manifest unfitness to rule." 92 The fourth article
affirmed the subordinate status of the Maharaja under the 1799 Treaty of
Srirangapatnam. 93 The fifth article fixed a subsidy of Rupees 350,000
payable by Mysore to the British government. 94 Other articles in the
Instrument curtailed the military powers of Mysore and the right to
communicate with other States. 95 Articles 14 and 15 required Mysore to
provide free land for telegraphs and railways. 96 In addition, a number of
articles provided for extradition of criminals wanted by the British
government and exemption of British citizens from trial in Mysore. 97 The
Instrument thus became the constitutional framework within which
future developmental, administrative, economic, and social policy would

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

HETrNE, supra note 18, at 92-93, 233-34.
CENT. WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 280.
HETrNE, supra note 18, at 48.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 49.
Id.

94.

Id.

95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.

86.
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eventually grow in Mysore. Although burdened with subsidy payments
and military and trade restrictions, for the purposes of administrative
responsibilities including land tenure and water access, Mysore was
deemed an autonomous entity with limited sovereignty. 98 In that
context, how was Mysore to protect its prescriptive rights when the legal
architecture of Indian society was not founded on the formal separation
of public, private, and state spheres, and when Indian social institutions
and practices were not premised on the existence of a comparable legal
architecture to that of Britain?
Although Mysore signed the Agreement of 1892, the document
remained a source of tension between the two states. The memoranda of
Sir K. Sheshadri Iyer, the Dewan of Mysore, dated June 10, 1890 (before
the agreement was signed) and March 26, 1892 (after the agreement was
signed) reflect the nature of those tensions. 99
IV. SHESHADRI IYER'S OBJECTIONS: TRADITIONAL
IRRIGATION WORKS UNDER COLONIAL LAW
Sir K. Sheshadri Iyer was the Dewan of Mysore and, in that
capacity, represented the State of Mysore in the water dispute. 100 His
appointment came at a time of divisive Madras-Mysore factions within
the Mysore bureaucracy. 101 Iyer was initially viewed as a member of the
Madras faction and, therefore, "pro-Resident." 1°2 Indeed, as a Madras
Brahmin with English education, his appointment was viewed favorably
by the Resident of the time. 10 3 Nevertheless, once charged with the
affairs of the state, Iyer had to plead the case of the Mysore farmers with
the British government. 1°4
There was a sense of urgency surrounding the negotiations,
particularly given the context of the "rendition" of Mysore. 0 5 The
"rendition"-the decision to unilaterally restore Mysore's autonomycame in the wake of the Great Mysore Famines of 1878-1879.106 The
famines reduced revenue to the British government by 25 percent
annually, with a loss of one million lives and large-scale depopulation of

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 50.
HUSSAIN, supra note 2, at 48-55.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 69-70.
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Id. at 2.
Id. at 48-51.
Id. at 35.
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certain regions. 10 7 The cause of the famine is generally attributed to the
failure of British irrigation and land revenue policies. 108 The famine
occurred when Mysore was under direct Crown rule during a brief
period of 50 years, from 1830 to 1880.109 The British solution to the abject
failure of direct Crown rule was to restore autonomy to Mysore so that
the state could sort itself out.110 The task of sorting out the state fell
squarely on Sheshadri Iyer's shoulders."'
Sheshadri Iyer pleaded the case for customary irrigation in the
Deccan region in the language of English law. In his memorandum of
June 10, 1890, Iyer argued in clause 6(a):
The supply of water which we propose to store and use for
irrigation and water-supply is only casual, intermittent, and
exclusively dependent upon the rainfall on Mysore land. We
have a natural right to collect and dispose of all water on
the surface of our land, and though, as between private
owners, such natural right would (subject to the exceptions
hereafter to be noticed) be restricted to water notflowing in a
defined channel, the case of a State is, I submit, very different.
It has to deal with large interests and establish means of
irrigation and water-supply over extensive areas, and it
cannot effectually dispose of surface waters before it enters some
defined channel. And I submit that the question as affecting the
State has to be decided on the higher grounds of public welfare
and general prosperity, and not according to the strict rules of
law applicable only to private rights.112
Iyer's memorandum raises significant questions about the appropriateness of applying English riparian principles to traditional irrigation
practices in the region. English riparian laws developed in the social,
historical, and ecological context of British society. The factors that
influenced the concepts underpinning riparian rights in England, and
European nations generally, evolved out of a number of factors peculiar
to those societies. The most important ecological factor was that the
majority of European rivers are perennial and snow-fed. With perennial
rivers, water flows into channels due to natural causes, and it is therefore
a given natural condition of the land. As a result, water rights in Europe
107.
108.

Id. at 35, 226-27.
VAN, supra note 65, at 226-35. See generally B.M. BHATIA, FAMINES IN INDIA: A
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Id. at 226.
Id. at 232-35.
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were considered an inalienable part of land rights until well into the
early twentieth century. 113 In the humid conditions of Europe, drainage
114
was the problem, not irrigation, as in the dry conditions of the East.
With the onset of the early twentieth century, the production of
hydropower due to technological developments, as well as the
expansion of corporations due to institutional developments, imposed
new demands on traditional riparian rights and prior appropriation
rights in law. Those demands led to an evolution in legal definitions and
concepts appropriate to the twentieth century demands of European
capitalism.115
European riparian common law dates back to the rule in
Chasemore v. Richards,11 6 in which the court reaffirmed the principle of
the primacy of land in riparian rights. At the time, the theoretical and
empirical knowledge in the West was, generally speaking, based on
engineering principles applied to urban environments. In the East,
knowledge-both theoretical and empirical-was, generally speaking,
11 7
agricultural and rural-oriented.
As discussed earlier, regulation of water in England and the
Euro-American nations developed within the structure of public and
private rights mediated by the state.' 18 In case of new uses, particularly
in the wake of industries, factories, and urbanization, the state's right to
intervene in the prescriptive rights of the landowners was limited to the
public dimensions of water use." 9 Prescriptive rights were strictly
120
If new users wanted
private rights and were attached to the land.
water was used by
how
with
problems
had
users
old
access to water, or
was considered
matter
the
the new users, (e.g., if they caused pollution),
2
a private dispute between citizens inter se.' ' Usually, riparian rights
gave landowners an edge in negotiating changes with new users of
water.122 Such disputes and subsequent resolutions negotiated among
citizens, and between citizens and the state, were by no means fair,
without undue influences, or independent of ideological, political, and

113.
114.

LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW 88 (1967).
M. NEWSON, LAND, WATER AND DEVELOPMENT 15-16 (2d ed. 1992).

115. See generally Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Development of
InternationalWater Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45 (1991); TECLAFF, supra note 113, ch. VI.
116. Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H.L. Cas. 349 (1859), All E.R. Rep. (1843-60).
117. NEWSON, supranote 114, at 5-6, 14.
118. See generally Teclaff, supra note 115, at 45-73; TECLAFF, supranote 113, ch. V.
119. NEWSON, supranote 114, at 18-19; TECLAFF, supra note 113, at 87-89.
120.

JOWlr & WALSH, supra note 11, at 1412; 14 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra

note 72, at 36.
121. Teclaff, supranote 115, at 61.
122. Teclaff, supranote 113, at 88, 97.
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moral overtones. However, the public-private-state structure of
European society insulated those issues from the strictly legal process of
the determination of rights and dispute resolution.
Instead, such negotiations occurred within the wider sociohistorical-environmental context of European civilization. According to
Robert W. Cox, a civilization is characterized by
an intersubjective order, that is to say, people understand
the entities and principles upon which it is based in
roughly the same way. Their understandings are
stimulated and confirmed by their own experiences of
material life. By understanding their world in the same
way, they reproduce it by their actions. Intersubjective
meanings construct the objective world of the state system
and the economy. 123
Sheshadri Iyer's memorandum attempted to highlight the
differences between the European and Indian intersubjective order. In
Indian states dotted with traditional irrigation structures capturing water
from rainfall, water did not form natural channels, nor was it a given
condition of land. Instead rainwater fell into channels and structures
constructed through human endeavor. Land was subject to the general
climatic conditions of a given region, including supplies fed to river
channels by the monsoons. Prescriptive rights could not-and did notapply where water entered artificial channels.
English law was premised upon the distinction between a
natural right and a legal right. 124 Artificial channels were excluded as
natural rights because, within the public-private-state structure, all
artificial channels were required to be based on some form of agreement,
whether implied or express. 125 In Kensit v. Great Eastern Railway Co.,1 26
the judge observed, "It seems to me to be a contradiction in terms to say
that any natural right can ever be acquired in an artificial cut." 127
Similarly, Iyer concluded in his Memorandum of 1890:
The State naturally would have a greater right of control
over water falling on the surface of its own lands and
gathering into a defined channel within its own frontier
123.

Robert W. Cox, Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for Europe, in

GRAMScI, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 259, 265 (Stephen Gill

ed., 1993).
124.
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than it would in the case of a stream rising outside its
frontier and merely flowing through it into the Madras
Districts; the obligations which may exist in respect of a
stream of the latter kind do not arise in any of the cases
under dispute. 128
The extensive networks of irrigation works in peninsular India
during Iyer's time were created through human intervention. However,
the assumption in English law that these irrigation works ought to have
been premised on some form of agreement, public or private, could not
be made because the property regimes, land titles, and allotment regimes
in pre-colonial India were very different, as Iyer argued in his
memoranda. If the water fell on Mysore land- literally, from the skies there was no way the state could dispose of that water before it entered
some channel. Therefore, according to Iyer, the issue had to be
determined "on the higher grounds of public welfare and general
prosperity, and not according to the strict rules of law applicable only to
private rights."1 29
Many potential ramifications arose from the most controversial
issue surrounding the 1890 interstate disputes -namely, at what point in
the hydrological cycle did water become open to legal appropriation in
public law and in private law? Potential ramifications arising from this
question included whether, in the case of monsoon ecology, disruption
of the hydrological cycle could be held as interference in the proprietary
rights of landowners over water, whether public laws could regulate the
conditions required for the hydrological cycle in tropical climates to
operate without hindrance so as to secure private rights over waters, and
whether there were appropriate institutional conditions under which
such regulation was possible given a particular geographic area and
period of time in the hydrological cycle. When viewed in this way, it is
easy to identify the inappropriateness of Western legal concepts in
regulating traditional Indian water use practices.
The objections Iyer raised in his memorandum relate to the
problem of fitting traditional water use practices into a modern legal
framework- a problem that remains with us to this day. Contemporary
debates on the usefulness of traditional irrigation technologies approach
the issue from a water conservation perspective and assume that any
water conserved will automatically result in equitable water
allocation. 130 Although the environmental critique of Indian water
128.
129.
130.

HuSsAIN, supra note 2, at 50.
3 CENT. WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 279.
See generally CTR. FOR SC. & ENV'T, supra note 4, vol. 4, ch. 4.

Spring 20051

THE TUNGABHADRA DISPUTES

appropriation advocates a return to traditional practices, the legal and
institutional regime supporting traditional practices remains enframed
within the concept of public and private property rights-such as
easement and prescription- for both natural and corporate persons, as
underpinned by the state. According to Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain:
The state may have to play a role in such conditions, or
appropriate multi-settlement people's institutions, with
adequate control and legal powers, will have to be
developed. Unfortunately, institutional aspects often do not
figure
prominently
in
the
planning
of
such
activities .... Institutions cannot function unless there is a
clear delineation of rights. A scheme of individual,
community and state rights over water must be defined by
planners and legal experts if traditional systems are to be
revived. 131
In the case of corporate entities, the legal assumption is that
issues of social equity in water relations can be fixed by prescribing an
appropriate mode of incorporation (e.g., co-operative, trust, company,
and others). 132 This view is shared by international development
agencies such as the World Bank, as well as national policy-making
agencies. 133 It is premised on instrumentalist views of black letter law
and on uncritical assumptions about law and societies and law in
societies. 134 Revisiting legal histories concerning the management of
natural resources becomes an important means of examining these
assumptions.
V. SHESHADRI IYER'S OBJECTIONS: THE TIME FRAME FOR
PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS
The second objection
Memorandum of 1890 reads:

raised

by Sheshadri

Iyer in

his

If a right of easement by prescription is claimed on behalf
of the Madras raiyats, I can only say (assuming that such a
131. Id. at 325.
132. Id. at 330-31.
133. AGRIc. OPERATIONS Div., INDIA COUNTRY DEP'T & THE WORLD BANK, I INDIA
IRRIGATION SECTOR REVIEW, World Bank Rep. No. 9518-IN 14 (1991); NEW DELHI PLANNING
COMM'N, GOV'T OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE COMMrIrEE ON PRICING OF IRRIGATION WATER xiii,
348-49 (1992); RATHINASAMAY SALETH, WATER INSTITUTIONS IN INDIA: ECONOMICS, LAW

AND POLICY 266-67 (1996); Salman M.A. Salman, The Legal Framework for Water User's
Associations: A Comparative Study, World Bank Technical Paper No. 360 (1997).
134. Cf. INDIAN L. INST., WATER LAW IN INDIA (Chhatrapati Singh ed., 1992).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

limiting right as an easement can at all be acquired by
Madras raiyats against the Mysore State) that it is most
difficult to say what period of time would be reasonable for
the acquisition of such a right against the State. For obvious
reasons, the 20 years of the Easement Act would be too
short a term, and in the case of Mysore, the fact of the
a
British Administration of the Province during half
135
questions.
the
upon
bearing
important
century has an
Iyer's objection indirectly references English customary and common
law rights, both of which are premised on the concept of "legal memory"
(i.e., user rights based on use over an extended period of time). In
English common law, legal memory dates back to the reign of Richard I
in 1189 after the Norman conquests. 136 In the colonial context, legal
137
memory dates back (implicitly) to colonial rule. However, the concept
of "legal memory" so integral to common law is really anachronistic in
the colonial context because, at the time of the interstate disputes of 1890,
the prescriptive rights under consideration had hardly been in existence
long enough to apply the "legal memory" entailed in common law. In
other words, prescriptive rights had not become recurring everyday
practices of social life entrenched in social habits and mores. Instead,
Indian prescriptive rights were both contemporary and evolving.
In the Madras Presidency, the Easement Act of 1882 (Easement
138
The Easement
Act) is an example of one such contemporary statute.
Act created new rights and identified new modes of water use
previously unknown in peninsular India. The Easement Act protected
prescriptive rights of citizens inter se, but only on terms imposed by the
state. 139 While prescriptive titles generally could not be claimed, vis-a-vis
the state, in the Presidencies, 140 the Agreement of 1892 was premised on
the understanding that the Madras Presidency could claim prescriptive
rights vis-A-vis another state, Mysore, even when the issue of water did
not feature in the Instrument of Transfer of 1881.141
135. HUSSAIN, supra note 2, at 50-51. "Raiyat," also written as "ryot," roughly translates
as "tenant of the soil, cultivator of land." See YULE & BURNELL, supra note 45, at 777.
136. JOWITr & WALSH, supranote 11, at 1413.
137. Colonial rule marked the beginning of legal systems recognized in modem Indian
law.
138. Indian Easements Act, supra note 7.
139. Id. §§ 15, 20, 21.
140. The law then applied only to Madras, because only the Madras Presidency was
under Crown jurisdiction. Mysore, in contrast, was under indirect rule. Titles based on
prescription must be distinguished from adverse possession under limitation statutes;
however, it is not necessary to probe into those distinctions for the purposes of this article.
141. 3 CENT. WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 280.
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The Indian Easement Act of 1882 was very different from its
predecessor, the Prescription Act of 1832 in England. The English statute
was enacted for the limited purpose of reducing the injustices arising
from the common law rule for prescriptive claims-from "the time
whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary"'142 -with
respect to the difficulties in interpreting presumptions about lost
grants. 143 The Indian Easement Act of 1882, in contrast, was markedly
different from the earlier British statute in both scope and effect. It
impinged upon Mysore in significant ways. The Madras Presidency's
claim was based on the Easement Act, enacted after the Instrument of
Transfer of 1881.14 It is difficult to conceive how Madras could claim,
vis-d-vis Mysore, that the raiyats in Madras had prescriptive rights
under the Indian Easement Act of 1882, particularly because the statute
prescribed a period of 20 years uninterrupted use to claim easement
145
rights by prescription.
The timeframes implied in the disputes of 1890 are problematic
in yet another way. During direct British rule between 1830 and 1880,
British administrators imposed a number of changes in the
administration of water and land revenue, with disastrous consequences
that culminated in the "rendition" of Mysore.146 The 50-year period was
characterized by an interruption in prescriptive uses by Mysore raiyats
through forcible occupation and conquest. 147 Even if the numerous
treaties with the Mysore rulers were taken at face value, the legality of
actions under occupation was open to challenge following the
"rendition." Prescription should, therefore, refer back to pre-1830 (i.e.,
before Mysore came under direct Crown rule and interrupted water
rights during the 50 years before the "rendition" under the Instrument of
Transfer of 1881). Thus, Iyer correctly argued in his memorandum:
"[T]he fact of the British Administration of the Province during half a
century has an important bearing upon the questions."1 48
Time - the essence of prescriptive rights - surfaces in the dispute
in a third way, as articulated in Iyer's Memorandum of June 1890:
Moreover, a right of easement can never be acquired by a
mere Permissive user. It cannot be said that Mysore never
intended to store its rainfall for irrigation and other
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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Id.; 14 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 72, at 39.
Indian Easements Act, supra note 7.
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purposes to a greater extent than it used to do at some
remote period. It is indeed more reasonable to infer that the
user in question was permitted to be in force only so long
as the State did not wish or were not able to store more
water. As a matter of fact, the history of the Mysore
Irrigation Department, as already shown, bears ample
testimony to the Mysore Government having always
intended to store and utilize as much of its rainfall as
possible, and the presumption of a grant from prescriptive
enjoyment is therefore most distinctly and expressly
negatived in the case of all Mysore streams, to the extent to
which they may be capable of being utilized for irrigation
149
and other purposes within Mysore Territory.
Prescriptive rights are, by definition, rights based on actual and de facto
use and enjoyment of the right. 150 What the Agreement purported to do
was to stop future uses of water. 151 In retrospect, it is interesting to note
that Mysore's claim was never based on a strict riparian rights theory of
primacy of territoriality and state sovereignty, or of water rights as
integral to landowners' rights. 52 Instead, Mysore's claim highlighted the
problem of superimposing legal concepts upon pre-existing social and
environmental relationships in society.
In perennial rivers, water is always present as a given natural
resource that runs with the land. In that environmental context, water
rights regulate water resources that actually existed in the past, exist
now, and will continue to exist in the future. Prescriptive water rights
were not anticipatory rights contingent on water being available in the
future, and, therefore, such rights did not allow for permissive use. In
the case of peninsular India, each monsoon brought new water. What the
Madras government sought to do through the Agreement was to
facilitate future uses in anticipation of water contributions that the
monsoon might bring in the years to come.' 5 3 Sheshadri Iyer's objections
drew attention to the fact that the intention to use water in the future
cannot become part of any current prescriptive claim.
Finally, time as a factor in the disputes manifests in the real
reason for the disputes and for the Agreement -the creation within the

149. HUSSAIN, supranote 2, at 51.
150. 14 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 72, at 36; Jowrrr & WALSH, supra note
11, at 1412.
151. 3 CENT. WATER COMM'N, supranote 1, at 278.
152. HUSSAIN, supra note 2, at 49, 52.
153. See 3 CENT. WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 278, 279.
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Madras Presidency of new works. According to Iyer's Memorandum of
June 1890:
It is also most important to remember that the so-called
right by prescription cannot be claimed either in the case of
recent Madras works or recent enlargement of old Madras
works; nor as regards water which now flows to waste over
existing Madras works, can any right whatsoever be
claimed by Madras, for the essence of a prescriptive right is
enjoyment and use, which cannot, of course be predicated
on what is allowed to run waste.154
Unlike the Kaveri delta, the Kurnool-Cuddapah canals were projects
promoted by the colonial government in Madras.155 The involvement of
the colonial state in irrigation came in the wake of the Industrial
Revolution in Britain and the resulting structural changes in the
economy. 156 At first, the Kurnool-Cuddapah canal was envisaged as a
state-owned enterprise to be undertaken by the Madras Irrigation and
157
Canal Company by mobilizing private capital for the project.
Although the first phase of the project was completed in 1859, the affairs
of the company deteriorated to such an extent that it was taken over by
the government in 1882.158 Major policy changes followed, including the
elimination of political boundaries as impediments to irrigation
projects. 159 These new works could not, in Mysore's view, be part of any
prescriptive claims in preference to Mysore's water use practices over
long periods of time. 160
VI. SHESHADRI IYER'S OBJECTIONS: THE LEGAL REGIME
Sheshadri Iyer's objections related to a central issue in the
Agreement-the institutional regime for prescriptive rights. He argued
that prescriptive rights could not be claimed by one state against another
state, as these rights were governed by municipal law under domestic
jurisdictions. 1 61 Notwithstanding Iyer's objections, given Mysore's status
154. HUSSAIN, supra note 2, at 52.
155. VANI, supranote 5, at 42.
156. Bipan Chandra, Colonialism: States of Colonialism and the Colonial State, 10 J.
CONTEMP. ASIA 272, 276 (1980); Bolding et al., supra note 55, at 808.
157. VANI, supra note 5, at 42.
158. Id. at 43.
159.

1977).
160.
161.

CENT. BD. OF IRRIGATION & POWER, HISTORY OF THE BOARD (C.V.J. Varma ed.,
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under the Instrument of Transfer of 1881, Mysore signed the Agreement
on February 18, 1892.162 The Agreement did not resolve the problem of
water sharing between the two states; instead, it raised a new set of
institutional issues relating to water use and rights.
On March 26, 1892, after signing the Agreement, Iyer raised
some post-agreement problems that are significant in retrospect. 163
Clause IV of the Agreement provided for arbitration in case of any
disputes between the states arising from the Agreement. 164 The arbitrator
was to be appointed either by the consent of both governments or by the
government of India. 165 However, arbitration would likely require
evidence, especially as prescriptive rights were always based on preexisting rights. Traditional irrigation systems did not require public
record keeping, as land and water uses were largely self-regulated by
village communities. 166 Thus, Iyer argued that Madras should be called
upon to maintain an inventory of irrigation works in order to make the
Agreement work.
In his March 1892 Memorandum, Iyer observed:
[I]n the case of any new irrigation work in Mysore which
comes under the class for which the Rules in question
provide a reference to the Madras Government, it is of the
utmost importance to investigate before hand, whether any
"Prescriptive right already acquired and actually existing"
in Madras Territory is likely to be affected by the proposed
Mysore Work. Such investigation should include the
collection of information as to the nature, extent and
dimensions of any existing prescriptive right in Madras,
when and how such right was acquired, how the same has
been enjoyed, etc., e.g. suppose a new work in Mysore
(coming under the Rules) is at all likely to diminish the
supply of water to an existing Madras tank, the information
to be collected should include (1) when the Madras tank
was constructed, or enlarged, (2) whether twenty years
have elapsed since such construction or enlargement, (3) its
capacity and the area which drains into it, (4) the area of
actual irrigation under it, (5) whether the new Mysore tank
is likely to cause any and what diminution of supply for the
existing irrigation in Madras, and, if so, whether such
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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dimunition can be regarded as meterial or as causing any
167
appreciable practical injury to such irrigation.
Despite Iyer's request, no systems were set up to undertake information
sharing. Indeed, given that a large colonial irrigation bureaucracy had
earlier proclaimed it a virtually impossible task, this is hardly
surprising. 168
The Agreement of 1892 did not resolve the disputes between the
states over waters of either the Kaveri or the Tungabhadra. In the case of
the Kaveri, the arbitration clause in the Agreement was invoked when
Mysore proposed to construct the Krishnarajasagara dam in 1910.169 The
arbitrator, Sir H.D. Griffins, in his award of May 12, 1914, upheld
Mysore's interpretation of prescriptive rights and attempted to put in
place systems for data gathering and information sharing between the
two states. 170 Griffins took a facilitative approach toward the
Krishnarajasagara project i71 and the government of India ultimately
ratified Griffins's award. 172 However, the Madras Presidency appealed
to the Secretary of State for India in Britain who subsequently suspended
the award.1 73
The main objection Madras had to the award was that Griffins
had considered only established and existing irrigation rights and did
not adequately protect Madras with respect to surplus waters of the river
and future extension of irrigation. 174 Through its objection, Madras
misconstrued the very concept of prescription. Fresh negotiations were
commenced and a new agreement was signed with respect to Kaveri
waters in February 1924.175 The new agreement saved the earlier 1892
Agreement, with the exception of several minor modifications. 176 The
modified Agreement of 1924 allowed projects in both Madras and
Mysore to go ahead. 177 The first attempt to resolve interstate disputes
through formal dispute resolution mechanisms thus ran aground.
In the case of the Tungabhadra, the arbitration clause was never
invoked and the 1892 Agreement went through a series of ad hoc
167.
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modifications, exemplified by the sub-agreements among Mysore,
Madras, and Hyderabad. 178 In 1933, Madras and Mysore concluded an
agreement resolving specific issues arising from the 1892 Agreement.
The 1933 Agreement provided for information sharing between the
states. 179 It also modified the prior approval requirement from Madras if
the construction of a new anicut did not irrigate new land, and it
resolved issues specific to certain irrigation works on specified streams
and tributaries and tanks. 8 °
In November 1938, Madras and the state of Hyderabad signed
an agreement for appropriation of the waters of the Tungabhadra for a
hydropower project at Mallapuram. 181 Mysore was not consulted,
although it could claim rights of prescription in subsequent years
because of the project. 182 The Tungabhadra project was conceived during
the Depression era, 183 during which time investments in public projects
were seen as a means of addressing economic problems posed by the
struggling economy. 8 4 With the onset of World War II and the
emergence of India as the regional base for Britain's war efforts, the need
for hydropower to feed the industries supporting the war efforts became
vital. 185 The Agreement of 1938 was curious as it provided for
construction of the project without resolving any legal issues between
the states. Clause 3 of the Agreement of 1938 states:
The object at present is to decide on the practicability of a
joint scheme between Hyderabad and Madras for a partial
appropriation of the Tungabhadra waters at Mallapuram
leaving all matters of absolute rights and claims and the
disputed points for future settlement. It shall be clearly
understood that neither Government shall be considered to
have given up any of its points in the final settlement of
rights and shall be free to raise the same at any time. 8 6
The Agreement allowed Madras to withdraw 50 billion cubic feet of
water and Hyderabad to withdraw 65 billion cubic feet of water for
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power generation, with return flow into the river channel. 8 7 The
assumption underlying the 1938 Agreement was that far-reaching social,
environmental, and economic changes in a region could be undertaken
without prejudice, as though it were possible to return to status quo ante
should the parties so desire at a future date. This assumption highlights
the problem of transposing private law concepts onto interstate relations.
The Agreement of 1944 between Madras and Hyderabad was
even more urgent and ad hoc. It superseded the 1938 agreement and
allowed for both Madras and Hyderabad to be entitled to withdraw 65
billion cubic feet of water. 88 The tenor of the 1944 Agreement suggested
that the intent of the parties was to get on with construction of the
hydropower plant without delay:
The object at present is to make it possible to start
immediately a joint scheme between Hyderabad and
Madras for a partial appropriation of the Tungabhadra
waters at Mallapuram leaving all matters of absolute right
and claims and disputed points for future settlements. 89
Mysore did not impugn the agreements between Madras and
Hyderabad by invoking the arbitration clause in the 1892 Agreement
between the two states. Nor did Mysore argue that Madras could not
create third party rights in the waters of the Tungabhadra that affected
prescriptive rights in the basins of the streams and tributaries specified
in the 1892 Agreement. Instead, Mysore proposed a project of its own,
above Mallapuram on the Bhadra at Lakavalli, and pressed for
renegotiating royalties payable for using Kaveri waters for power
generation at the Sivasamudram project. 190 Mysore allowed that the
Agreement "shall constitute a final settlement of the rights of the
respective governments in the waters of the Tungabhadra basin above
Mallapuram." 191 However, the Agreement curiously went on to add:
If at anytime at the instance of the other party claiming a
right to the waters of the Tungabhadra it becomes
necessary to have recourse to arbitration in respect of the
sharing of the Tungabhadra waters and if the arbitration
tribunal were to award to the Governments of Mysore and
Madras a quantity differing from those referred to in
Clause 1, 6, and 9 above, [i.e., agreement of July 1944] the
187.
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two Governments hereby agree to abide by such
award.... Nothing contained in the foregoing clauses shall
be deemed to qualify or limit in any manner the operation
of the Agreement dated the 18th February, 1892 between
the Governments of Madras and Mysore in regard to
192
matters other than those to which this agreement relates.
It is clear from this addition that the practical need to work around the
1892 Agreement in order to facilitate hydropower, irrigation, and
multipurpose projects meant that legal and institutional developments
never consolidated and took root to produce a legal memory. If the
essence of prescription in England was premised on legal memory,
prescription in the colonial context achieved exactly the opposite result
by erasing legal memory of pre-colonial customary uses and practices
through ad hoc importation of legal principles devoid of historical,
social, environmental, and geographical context. In the new legal edifice,
the only legal memory dated from the time of colonization. This legal
edifice, founded on colonization as the legal memory, became the
structural foundation for a neo-imperial/neo-colonial society in the New
World Order that followed the end of World War II, internationally, and
Independence in India.
The fragmented negotiations between Madras and Hyderabad
and between Madras and Mysore could not form a durable basis for the
use of Tungabhadra waters between the three states. In December
1945193 and April 1946,194 two further agreements were concluded in an
effort to iron out the issues arising from the projects undertaken on the
Tungabhadra by the three states, as well as all the riparian states,
including Bombay and Sangli. Post-Independence disputes over
Tungabhadra waters resurfaced in the politics of the reorganization of
states, particularly where the politics of democracy and federalism
intertwined with the politics of development and economic integration
nationally and internationally. 195 It fell on the Krishna Water Disputes
Tribunal, in an award decided in 1976, to finally determine the status of
196
the 1892 Agreement.
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VII. THE TUNGABHADRA AGREEMENTS AND THE KRISHNA
WATER DISPUTES TRIBUNAL
Post-Independence, in a new world order dominated by the
discourse of "development," the Agreement of 1892, and subsequent
agreements modifying it ad hoc over time became an important issue
before the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, Mysore
impugned all interstate agreements on Tungabhadra waters. 197 Mysore's
claims were based on its perception that the 1892 Agreement was
obtained under coercion; that it was imposed by a colonial government
on a vulnerable state and therefore was unconscionable.1 98 The political
heirs of Sheshadri Iyer were not wanting in their forensic capabilities.
Mysore's representatives argued that a contract must be entered
into without undue influence or coercion and that the agreements did
not survive upon the merger of the Indian States into the Union of India
in 1947.199 Further, they argued, the agreements did not survive after the
reorganization of states in 1956, since the boundaries of the states were
00
significantly altered. 2
The agreements of 1944 were bad in law, as they did not include
Bombay and Sangli, the two other riparian states with interests in the
waters of the Tungabhadra. 20 1 The June 1944 Agreement with
Hyderabad, Mysore argued, did not survive after the Indian
Independence Act of 1947, the coming into force of the Indian
Constitution and the merger of the state of Hyderabad into the Union of
India. 202
Andhra Pradesh, the successor-state to Madras in the disputes,
argued that the population of the state had developed equitable interests
in the changes that colonization had brought to the region. 2 3 The
political changes following Independence, accession to the Union of
India, and states' reorganization notwithstanding, Andhra Pradesh was
entitled to keep the benefits that it had inherited from the Madras
Presidency under direct British rule. 204
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These legal arguments raised fundamental issues about the
meaning and effect of de-colonization. Confronted with the possibility of
having to probe into the legal status of a series of historical events
memorialized in legal statutes and deeds, such as the Indian
Independence Act of 1947,205 the Constitution of India, 2° 6 and the treaties
of accession to the Union of India with the states of Mysore, 2°7
Hyderabad, 2 8 and Sangli, 2°9 the tribunal persuaded the parties to come
to a negotiated settlement on the Tungabhadra disputes. 210 The states
agreed that the Agreement of 1892 imposing restrictions on projects on
specified streams should be modified and reduced. 211 More importantly
the states also agreed that
in the events that have happened it is not necessary to
decide these issues [the legal status of the colonial
agreements] as this Hon'ble Tribunal has general
jurisdiction in the matter of equitable distribution of waters
of the river Krishna (including the waters of the
Tungabhadra river) between the States of Andhra Pradesh,
212
Maharashtra and Mysore.
Nevertheless, the issues previously raised by Sheshadri Iyer and the
rationale of the Madras Presidency did not go away. Instead they
resurfaced under claims for equitable apportionment and the difficult
question of how equity should be defined in post-Independence India.
These issues were eventually thrashed out-not in the language of
prescriptive rights under English law-but under equitable
apportionment, as defined by the Helsinki Rules and international
213
law.
If the Agreement of 1892 evidenced a disjuncture between
formal legalism and reality in society, the arguments of the states before
the Tribunal continued to be based on a disjuncture between formal
legalism and social reality. Indeed, the disjuncture between formal law
and social reality is a characteristic feature of colonial law, as the
Agreement of 1892 clearly exemplifies. This disjuncture forms a
structural feature of Indian society, one that entrenches a schism
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
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between law and society and reproduces the imperial-colonial relations
long after Independence.
VIII. COLONIAL LAW IN INDEPENDENT INDIA
The arbitration award of Sir H.D. Griffins ran aground because
of the absence of a distinctly colonial constitutional and institutional
framework for managing colonial social relations in imperial interests.
Until then, imperial governance was largely through administrative fiat
and to a lesser extent statutory law. Subsequently, early twentieth
century imperial governance focused on constitutional and institutional

developments. 214
The 40-year span from 1905 to 1945 was a period of wide
ranging constitutional and institutional change, both internationally and
within India. On the sub-continent, there were two principal strands of
change that intertwined in the lead up to the Union of India following
Independence in 1947. The constitutional and institutional changes
within British India comprised one strand. The other was the slow
progress toward a federal structure through integration of the Indian
States into a federal framework. Unlike federal constitutions in capitalist
countries, the Indian Constitution comprises both unitary and federal
features.21 5 Necessarily simplifying the issues, the unitary features
evolved from the constitutional and institutional developments within
British India.21 6 The federal features evolved from the integration of
Indian States.
While the constitutional reforms of 1907,217 1919,218 and 1935219
created the conditions for independence, the institutional reforms
following the constitutional developments created national water
institutions necessary to appropriate and regulate water use in the
interest of development.220
These developments in British India dovetailed with efforts to
integrate the Indian States into a larger Union of India. The Treaty of
214. D'Souza, InternationalLaw, supra note 37, at 248-49; D'Souza, supra note 23, at 26364.
215. INDIA CONST. pt. XI, sched. 7 (as amended up to Constitution Sixty-First
Amendment Act, 1988).
216. D'Souza, InternationalLaw, supra note 37, at 248-49; D'Souza, supra note 23, at 26364.
217. ANAND & SETH, supranote 8, at 56.
218. Id. at 215; see also D'Souza, InternationalLaw, supra note 37, at 249; D'Souza, supra
note 23, at 263-64.
219. ANAND & SErH, supra note 8, at 317; see also D'Souza, InternationalLaw, supra note
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Mysore of 1913221 relaxed the restrictions on Mysore under the
Instrument of Transfer of 1881. The Chamber of Princes 222 was formed in
1921, setting up formal consultative processes between the Indian States,
the Government of India, and the British Government. The Chamber of
Princes also facilitated collective representation of the Indian States in
the League of Nations. 223 In the absence of the Chamber, each Indian
State, being sovereign in legal theory, would be entitled to separate
representation- a prospect that could have scuttled unification and
constitutional federalism. The Government of India Act of 1935224
provided for accession to the Union of India, which Mysore and many
other states declined. 225 The Act nevertheless created the basis for
22 6
unification.
The constitutional status of water and the institutional
arrangements for water closely follow the twin strands mentioned above.
227
Today, water remains a state subject within the constitutional schema,
largely a result of the Indian States' refusal to relinquish control over
water.22 8 While constitutional integration of the Indian States proved
difficult, institutional integration proved relatively easier. The ideology
of "progress," "modernization," and, later, "development" smoothed the
integration of economic institutions. 229 The Central Board of Irrigation 230
and Bureau of Information for Irrigation, 23 1 which formed pursuant to
the constitutional reforms of 1919, provided for membership of the
Indian States in order to facilitate the coordination and development of
232
water resources on the subcontinent.
The experiment with indirect rule in Mysore, within which the
interstate Agreement of 1892 took place, was an important milestone in
imperial governance and provided many valuable lessons. The twin
objectives of indirect rule-economic control and political devolutioncan be seen in the problems relating to the 1892 Agreement.
221. HETrNE, supra note 18, at 51-53.
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224. B. SHIVA RAO, supra note 205, at 511-57.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. INDIA CONST. pt. XI, sched. 7 (as amended up to Constitution Sixty-First Amendment Act, 1988).
228. See B. SHIVA RAO, supra note 205, at 303-25, 747-85, 776-92.
229. D'Souza, supranote 195, at 724.
230. CENT. BD. OF IRRIGATION & POWER, supra note 159, at 5.
231. Id. at 8.
232. Id. at 14.

Spring 2005]

THE TUNGABHADRA DISPUTES

Many social contradictions that dogged colonial rule continue to
surface periodically in modem water disputes. If Iyer argued that
institutional mechanisms for the 1892 Agreement needed to be in place
to make the Agreement work, the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal, after
a lengthy hearing - and an equally lengthy award - concluded that it did
not have power to rule on institutional issues. 233 It left the award without
effective enforcement machinery. 234 The difficulty of reconciling
traditional and modern irrigation practices within a colonial legal
framework, evidenced by the erudite forensic representations of Iyer,
hounded the hearings before the tribunal. 235 Should there ' be a fresh
dispute over Tungabhadra waters, these representations may resurface
once again, especially given the current interest in traditional irrigation
technologies. Thus, the starting line for legal memory is continually
brought forward in time. If the Agreement of 1892 sought to erase the
pre-colonial memory, the tribunal, by superseding the Tungabhadra
236
agreements, sought to erase the colonial memory.
legal memory relates back to the
Post-Independence
Constitution, as the tribunal's ruling on the Tungabhadra disputes
demonstrates. As the colonial government borrowed the conceptual
categories of law from English law, the tribunal borrowed its conceptual
categories from international law, which in turn was an application of
Euro-American law to the needs of the twentieth century. 237 Thus, legal
formalism and social disjuncture continue in India today. The
constitutional developments in the first half of the twentieth century
entrenched this disjuncture between law and society, making it a
238
permanent structural feature of Indian society.
IX. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
The role of law in society may be seen as twofold, both
conceptual and praxiological. At the conceptual level, law provides the
framework defining relationships between nature, society, and people. It
provides the conceptual categories that constitute the normative order,
which, in turn, becomes the frame of reference for social transactions in
relation to nature and to people. These social transactions may reaffirm,
confirm, modify, change, alter, or negate the normative order.
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Nevertheless, the engagement is still within the normative order that the
legal categories prescribe as the framework for social and environmental
relationships. Concepts in society develop through the historical and
environmental experiences of people and are therefore grounded in
history and geography, as well as time and place.
At the pragmatic level, its strong praxiological orientation gives
law a policy focus that deals with immediate problems. Despite the
strong legal arguments advanced by Sheshadri Iyer, he signed the
Agreement of 1892, just as Mysore -before the Krishna Water Disputes
Tribunal -did not ask to renegotiate the terms of integration with the
Union of India. At this second, pragmatic level, law appears dehistoricized and de-spatialized. Inevitably, imperial law is articulated in
universal categories that must be fleshed out by the different limbs of the
state: executive, legislative, and judicial. Lifting the veil of law becomes
necessary to understand the complex legal and societal interactions that
the universalism of imperial law conceals so adeptly.
Taken together, the two levels at which law operates mirror
social relationships. Social and environmental relations become
entrenched through everyday practices that are, in turn, reinforced
through the legal framework. The role of law in reproducing social
relations in capitalist countries forms the subject matter of an extensive
literature in critical legal studies. 239 However, the role of imperial law in
reproducing colonial social relations in societies with colonial histories
has not received as much attention.
The question "What is de-colonization in law?" touches on
fundamental structural questions of Indian society. By locating interstate
water disputes - one of the most pressing legal issues of our time - in
colonial law and history, this article has attempted to draw attention to
problems of imperial law in neo-colonial societies.
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